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The  Political Culture Concept: 
  he Empirical Power of Conceptual Transformation 
ABSTRACT 
The concept of a political culture is having a second life. Its first, 
associated with development studies and the behaviorist revolution of the 1950s 
and 1960s, faded with the decline of modernization theory.' Its recent- revival is 
. . .  - .- -. . . .. .. ~. . . ~. .... .. .-- .. . . . . . . - . . 
among cultural and social historians influenced by anthropology, linguistics, and 
European social theory. Political scientists, political psychologists, and 
sociologists are conspicuously absent from this company. There is thus a 
worrisome lack of reflection on the connection between the two lives of the 
concept. But i t  is necessary to recall and explain the problems of the previous 
approach to prevent their repetition. I t  is argued - - here that the reductionism 
characteristic of the first life derived from sociology's early rejection of culture 
as a means to sociological knowledge. Yet because the new political culture 
concept insists on the autonomy of culture from society, it reproduces some of 
the same problems of the previous one--especially the binary opposition between 
culture and society. The untapped challenge for the new is epistemological; the 
concept of a political culture can move us beyond the society versus culture 
dichotomy supported by'both the old and the new versions of the term. This 
paper presents the old and the new concepts of political culture and explores of 
the reasons for the failure of the first usage and for both the fruits and the 
limitations of the second. Historical studies of the political culture of property, 
citizenship-rights, and social science knowledge is examined to demonstrate the 
empirical power of conceptual transformation. 
Margaret R. Somers 
Political culture is a newly rejuvenated concept with a shady past. In 
between its new and old lives, many hoped the term was moribund. But its new 
incarnation is so energetic, its new applications so intellectually fruitful--and so 
seemingly unrelated to its previous life--that there seems to be little concern about 
its less than noteworthy past. Indeed there is an almost complete lack of 
reflection on the relationship, if any, between the two lives.l Even in the now 
thriving subfield of the sociology of culture when political culture appears in its 
new usage, it is rarely with any explicit discussion of -its history. This dissociation 
from the past is not surprising. Political culture's past life was almost exclusively 
associated with development studies and the behaviorist revolution of the 1950s 
and 1960s. But political scientists, political psychologists, and sociologists, are 
conspicuously absent from its revival among cultural and social historians, who are 
in turn primarily influenced by anthropology, linguistics, and literary theory.2 
Given that few in this latter group are hardly likely to be acquainted with the 
former, it is not surprising that they fail to discuss political culture in its previous 
incarnation. 3 
But forgetting often proves a lost opportunity. For one thing, the success of 
a new theory often lies in its ability to account for the failures of .the previous ones 
(MacIntyre 1980). The ability to recall the problems of the previous political 
culture approach permits -insights into differences and similarities between the 
concept's two lives. Such powers of recollection will not only help us to  prevent 
the reproduction of prior mistakes but also increase the probability of a richer 
analysis. In this line of reasoning, the three purposes of this paper are to examine 
the old and the new concepts of political culture, explicate the reasons for the 
failure of the first usage and explore both the fruits and the limits of the second, 
and to demonstrate through an historical case--the political culture of property-- 
just how much untapped potential for social analysis the revived concept still 
holds. 
1 . Alexander (1 988a, 1988b, 19901 and Calhoun (1 990) are important exceptions. 
2 . Important exceptions include those..few political scientists who have either returned to or 
have come anew to the political culture concept from the recent perspective. See especially 
Laitin (1 986, 19881, Wildavsky (1 9871, Thompson,etal. (1  9901, Eckstein (1 9881, Anderson (1 99 11, 
lnglehart / 19881 
3 . For examples of the new usage in history see Eley (1990a,1990b), Hunt 
(1 988,1989a, 1989b1, Sewell (1 990); in anthropology see Dirks (1 9901, Kertzer (1 9881. 
Phase I (1950s-1960s): The political culture concept was first born out of an 
attempt to grapple with the towering problem that has haunted the social sciences 
since their inception: how can a systemically-conceived social structure episte- 
mologically accommodate meaningful human action? Or, how is moral agency 
reproduced within social systems? Political analysis in particular has long been 
especially intractable to a solution to the balance between cultural interpretation 
and social explanation. Perhaps more than most social processes i t  is political 
ones, such as revolutions, that tend to involve seemingly abstract macro-structural 
phenomena (wars, depressions, industrialization) as well as social actions to which 
humans assign meaning. 
The agenda for defining this balance with a functionalist tint was set when 
Kroeber and Parsons (1958) argued for the necessity of distinguishing between 
culture and society in a particular manner.4 Whereas the latter should refer to the 
system of interaction among individuals and collectivities, culture should only 
address "values, ideas and other symbolic-meaningful systems" (pp. 582-83). 
Taking up the dilemma of how moral action can co-exist with a law-driven social 
system, Parsons particularly argued that a sociological theory needed to attribute 
meaning as well as instrumentality to action. To this end he developed his famous 
tri-partite schema which analytically differentiated among three systems: the 
social, the cultural, and the psychological. Furthermore, Parsons argued that 
these analytic distinctions were evidence that all social interactions included 
dimensions of all three--meaningful referencing to the cultural system, 
indisputable rootedness in the social system, and causal influence from 
psychological motivations (Parsons and Shils 195 1). 
This was an enormous move forward for the social sciences; it reflected 
Parsons' struggle to overcome the prevailing reductionism of the social science 
approach to culture and meaning. In moving away from E.B. Tylor's then 
reigning anthropological definition of culture as all human practices beyond the 
biological, Parsons was taking the first definitive step to what sociologists shortly 
thereafter began to call a "normative theory of culturew--so-called because it 
introduced ideals and meaning into social action (Jaeger and Selznick 1964). 
Parsons, however, then made a consequential decision in his approach to culture-- 
one which reflected his principal epistemological worry over the appropriate 
foundations for sociological knowledge. He argued that while cultural codes and 
4 . This and the following paragraphs on Parsons are enormously indebted to Alexander's 
important recent contribution to this topic 11990). 
symbolic systems are useful foundations for art  and philosophy, they cannot be 
used to ground the conditions for sociological knowledge. For concrete sociological 
explanation and analysis the exploration of cultural codes and meanings could 
contribute to social knowledge only by being transposed from analytically 
autonomous symbols to socially institutionalized norms and, hence, internalized 
into social values. Parsons concluded that sociology should thus limit its research 
on culture to the social system's processes of values and norms. This shift of 
emphasis from the analytic autonomy of culture to its social psychological 
reduction was an unfortunate move for Parsons (Alexander 1990, p. 5) and for 
sociology. The tremendous advances in the Parsonian attention to culture were 
canceled out with one stroke--ironically, the same stroke he had used to define a 
sociology of culture in the first place. If a conception of culture was to contribute 
to and indeed count as social knowledge, Parsons argued that it would need to be 
attached to the subjectivities of individuals and collectivities. Without this, he saw 
cultural systems as merely free-floating entities ultimately outside of sociological 
analysis. 
In a single move the Parsonian paradigm gave the culture concept the 
promise of a central place in social analysis but only a functional role in the social 
system. This allowed Parsons to effectively address the Hobbesian question that 
drove the substantive research of his life: how and why do societies hold together; 
/ 
how and why do they fall apart or enter into periods of instability (Parsons 1967)?. 
Perhaps more significantly, though, the shift undermined the possibility of a non- 
reductionist cultural sociology. I t  excluded cultural analysis from the legitimate 
realm. of sociological knowledge. 
This approach to culture was also reproduced in its application to political 
processes. Following Parsons social scientists likewise used the concept of political 
culture to indicate the "subjective feelings, attitudes, and consequent behaviors" 
believed to characterize individual and collective "political orientationsw--that is 
values--across a political system (Rostinbaum 1975, p.4). A political culture 
congealed the "underlying psychological forces" believed to shape much of civic life. 
If political values were considered to be the source of political behavior, political 
culture was seen as a window onto deeper understanding of numerous political 
events and processes--from coups and revolutions in Africa and Latin America, to 
Protestant and Catholic civil war in Northern Ireland.5 In applying the concept, 
5 . Among the most well-known classics of the period for political sociology are Almond and 
Powell (19661, Almond and Verba (19631, Banfield (19651, Black (19661, Deutsch and Foltz (19631, 
social scientists specified its dimensions to follow a continuum from "integrated" to 
"disintegrated." This represented the degree to which "most people" have 
"similar, or compatible, political culture orientations" which are "congenial" to 
their political institutions. Congenial values and orientations were used to explain 
degrees of accommodation to a society's stability on the one end, while disruptive 
behavior (such as strikes and critical protest against government actions) was held 
to be the result of dysfunctional values on the other (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye 
1966; Pye and Verba 1965). In combination these core elements of a political 
culture were perceived to be the fundamental variables to explain "the creation 
and maintenance of a society's fundamental political order" (Rosenbaum 197 5, p. 
6).6 
But where did political values come from and how could variations in such 
values be explained? While numerous mediating factors were presented as partial 
answers (e.g. political socialization and psychological internalization), the basic 
social science claim was that political culture was a product not of the cultural but 
of the social system. In one of the classics of this genre, Smelser (1959) posits 
that early nineteenth-century English working-class social movements were the 
result of a transitional conflict between the "traditional" values attached to a 
traditional domestic artisanal division of labour, and the alienating "role strain" 
produced by conflicts over new values demanded by the industrial factory labour 
process. Similarly, Lipset (1967) suggests that "extremist" French trade unions 
were the result of the particularistic values of French employers (attached to a 
pre-modern economic system) which "lagged behind" the necessary universalist 
values necessary to modern capitalist markets.7 The only epistemological status 
acceded to the actual codes and meanings of a political culture was the tendency to 
Eckstein (19641, Lipset (19631, Pye (19661, Pye and Verba (19651, Smelser (19591, Verba and Nie 
(1 973). 
6 In the words of one of the leading political scientists of the day, political culture refers to 
the "attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and 
provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior" (Pye 1966, pp. 104-51. These 
succinct definitions also explain the concentrated and extensive research attention paid to the 
political culture concept in the decades of the late 19501s, 1960's and early 1970's. Research 
into political culture was intended to be a window into the sources of massive political instability 
and the "pervasive political violence in the modern world" that seemed to characterize the 
problems of nation building in the postcolonial world. Introductory textbooks to the subject begin 
by documenting everything from the number of successful coups in Latin America, Central Africa, 
Middle Eastern and West African nations--in one case, between 1945 and 1975--to the 
internal ethnic battles and disputes in countries ranging from Greece to Ireland to Canada (See, 
for example, Rosenbaum 1975, Ch. 1 and passim). 
7 . Examples can be found in the excellent collection on culture and society by Alexander and 
Seidman (1  9901. 
argue that "social progress" could be impeded by "backwards" values which lagged 
behind long after traditional societies had been transformed into modern social 
systems. According to Banfield's (1965) famous theory, for example, the political 
culture of southern Italy had values and practices so "morally backwards" that it 
left the region in no condition to receive the benefits, or take on the 
responsibilities, of Western economic progress. 
I t  was the conception of a "continuum of political integration," however, 
that most sharply defines the functionalist political culture concept and locates it 
within an historical period overwhelmingly concerned with rapid global 
disequilibrium and political violence. When in the late '60s and '70s a full-scale 
assault on the paradigm was launched by political scientists and sociologists 
employing new structural approaches, not surprisingly the political culture concept 
was one of the first casualties. The idea of political culture had apparently become 
so tainted by its previous usage that it now appeared to lack redeeming features. 
In the midst of an explicit search for the causes of political stability in the post- 
war world of nation-building and decolonization, moreover, it is more plausible 
that that the fate of the political culture concept was sealed by its utility in 
addressing what had become the overriding social science concern--one could say 
obsession--about societal equilibrium and political instability characteristic of the 
political climate of the 1950s and 1960s.8 Influenced by various versions of 
Marxism, Weberian theories of bureaucracy, and the Braudelian Annales school, 
the new structural approaches rejected theories of "backwards" cultures and 
values as explanations for social change or stability. Instead , the new approaches 
stressed analyses of structural domination by classes, developed over 
underdeveloped nations, core nations over periphery ones, states over societies. To 
the extent that political culture was addressed explicitly in any of the influential 
structural theories of this period, it was solely for purposes of criticism and 
rejection.9 In light of the way in which traditional behaviorist social scientists 
constructed non-"modern" or non-Western cultural practices as primitive and 
8 . The concept was also pegged to a massive research methodology that was cross-national 
and global in scope, entailing highly quantified survey research techniques. The monumental 
growth of US research technologies, the majority of which were government-sponsored, was both 
cause and consequence of this context. US scholars were sent all over the globe to survey 
world populations in the belief that analyzing and comparing the global data would provide 
explanatory links between individual attitudes and behaviors and the very survival of political 
regimes (See especially Almond and Verba 1963 Ch. 1). 
9 . Moore 119651, Tilly 11975a, 1975b, 19781, Tilly eta1 119751, Wallerstein 11 9741, and Skocpol 
11979) were among the most influential critics, each of them offering major alternative paradigms 
for social change and development 
constraining forces on economic progress, political culture was an idea most critics 
of functionalism were happy to abandon. 10 
Phase II(1970s-1990s): In its rejuvenated form, the new political culture 
. concept keeps very different company. With the exception of Bellah (1970,1980) 
and Tiriyakian (1978,1988) the primary recognition of a revised concept has come 
from intellectual and social historians as well as cultural theorists influenced by 
European social theorists, philosophers and linguists--notably Saussure and 
Foucault--cultural anthropologists, such as Geertz (1973, 1983), Bourdieu (1977) 
and Mary Douglas (1966), and such anthropologically-oriented social historians as 
E.P. Thompson (1965) and Natalie Davis (1975).11 And even though there are 
now many different conceptions of the meaning of political culture, some common 
themes can be gathered from the various literatures. 
Whereas the Parsonian paradigm used political culture as an aggregate of 
subjective values individually held towards the political system and ultimately 
generated by the social system, the revisionists see it very differently. They define 
culture in both analytic and concrete empirical terms as an autonomous and 
contested representational system or form of political association which is 
comprised of "rules and codes" in no way reducible to or decipherable through the 
social system. Such political practices and discourses have autonomous meanings 
and autonomous histories. While they may be seen in part as the accretions of 
multiple social acts, they cannot be understood as residing in subjective values 
10 . Barrington Moore's comparative historical analysis of the varying routes to the "modern 
world" was the text that set the terms for revisionist scholarship (Moore 19661. Moore 
provided a monumental challenge to the antihistorical premises of political culture and 
modernization theory--that there exists a single "normal" developmental path to the modern world 
and that variations from this pattern are deviant and dysfunctional, rather than alternative routes. 
By problematizing variation, rather than assuming deviance or "lags," Moore demonstrated how 
comparative historical methodology could be used to address issues of social change and class 
analysis t o  a very different effect than that of modernization theory. Moore's mantle was 
handed on in the 1970s to both Wallerstein (1974) and Anderson (19741 with the publication of 
the initial volumes in each o f  their projected multi-volume recastings of the making of the 
western capitalist world. Tilly's Formation volume (1975) should be seen as the third point in 
this early triad of second generation (considering Moore and Thompson as the first generation) 
influences on the shape of the historic turn in macrosociology. See Skocpol's (1984) edited 
collection on historical sociology for the best summation of these influences. 
11 . The most well-known of these include Furet (19811, Sewell (19801, Hunt (19841, Chartier 
(1987, 1988, 19911, Lacqueur (1991) and those represented in Hunt's (1989) collection The New 
Cultural History. There is also a recent small growth o f  American sociologists using it either 
explicitly or implicitly (Alexander 1988b; Collins 1988; Forment 1990; Lamont 1987, 1989; 
Somers 1991, 1992; Swidler 1986, 1987; Wuthnow 1987, 1990). In its new incarnation the 
political culture concept has only occasionally been defined explicitly, and in these cases by social 
historians (Hunt 1989b; Baker 1990; Chartier 199 1). 
"internalized" in persons. Rather these practices and political discourses exist 
independently in many forms ranging from legal doctrines, to political or civil 
"societies" to discursive representations. 12 This analytic autonomy, in turn 
allows, even mandates, a central role for culture in contributing to political 
outcomes. The structuring power of cultural discourses and codes, for example, 
permits the understanding of political action and the meanings attributed to action 
to be reconstituted in an entirely different way from those that focus on the "fit" 
of political values with a social or political system. Identities, rather than 
interests, become the key theme for understanding action (Pizzorno 1985; Bourdieu 
1985; Somers 1986,1992). 
Another distinction from the previous usage is that these works question 
whether.& is possible to discover a single meaning in any given cultural practice. 
Instead the central focus of empirical investigations shifts to an emphasis on how 
aspects of political culture are variably appropriated and utilized, made and 
remade, and with what effect--usually in the context of different relations of power 
(Foucault 1982; Chartier 1988). Such an approach leads us to more closely 
reconfigure the constitutive and, often contested, intersubjective meanings 
embedded in social processes and collective actions without falling into the 
potential hermeneutic trap of looking for either fully subjective or singular 
conceptions of meaning--recognizably one of the long-time goals of post-Marxist 
and post-functionalist social analysis. 
Empirically, much of the new work on political culture has focused on the 
French Revolution via French semiology and Saussurean linguistics. The hallmark 
of the semiotic approach to culture and meaning was its rejection of the "speech- 
act" which Saussureans believe to be a voluntarist theory. Instead the semiotic 
approach emphasizes the internal study of linguistic systems as a relatively 
coherent system of symbols, meanings, and linguistic practices. Semiotics defines 
language as a system of signs abstracted from other dimensions of social life and 
organized by its own internal rules. Social actors who use speech are constrained 
by these formally independent sign codes and its internal relationships. Once 
12 . See especially Chartier (1988)  for a deeply sociological definition of "representations". In 
recent works on the French Revolution, for example, the range of topics addressed under the 
rubric of political culture--and thus thought to represent various forms of cultural rules and 
codes--include ongoing coffee-house associations and reading societies (Chartier 1991); political 
symbols, festivals, and revolutionary rituals (Ouzuf 1988;  Hunt 1984); journalistic techniques; the 
languages of politics (Furet 1 9 8  1); Enlightenment categories of thought republican conceptions of 
Reason (Baker 1990); the daily life of the sans culottes (male and female) and the gender 
dimensions of republicanism (Landes 1988). 
these cultural codes have been deciphered, the social analyst can explore how real 
social actors use thein in any empirical situation. The result is an analysis of 
social process that only has intelligibility in the context of its cultural mediation 
(Saussure 1964, [1916]; Alexander and Seidman 1990). Saussure did not limit his 
argument to linguistic systems, however; he argued forcefully that his semiotic 
approach applied equally to social life as to language. Thus social actions do not 
merely interact with an intersubjective cultural system of language they can 
themselves be conceived as intersubjective cultural systems with internal codes, 
relationships, and social discourses. It is the influence of this Saussurian social 
semiotics, that can most directly be seen in the French historians' use of political 
culture. 
With semiotics as his intellectual weapon, Francois Furet (198 1 j launched 
one of the first and most influential of assaults on the long-reigning Marxist 
interpretation of the French Revolution. Instead of class struggle, demographics, 
or deep structures, Furet argued for the autonomy of politics and culture as the 
driving force behind the causes and consequences of the Revolution. Without using 
the term political cultire explicitly, Furet's semiotic explanation eschewed any 
form of interest-based analysis. Instead it focused on the impact and meaning of 
the new democratic republic political language of the revolutionary struggle. 
Furet thus conceived of political forms in cultural and discursive terms with their 
own internal systems of logic and relationality rather rely on for explanations 
ideologies or the behavioral effects of aggregated values. 
In Politics, Culture, and Class in  the French Revolution (1984), Lynn Hunt 
also modified the use of an autonomous cultural explanation. Although she 
broadened her use of political culture to stress conflict and the role of 
revolutionary actors, Hunt, like Furet, insisted that social actions and political 
outcomes are unintelligible without a decoding of the internal systems of political 
culture and political forms a t  play in the revolutionary process. Rejecting any 
analytic subordination of political culture to either class or state formation, Hunt 
looked beyond ruling elites and the institutions and policies of governing regimes 
for sources of popular political consciousness, meaning, and action. Subsequently, 
the ideology of democratic republicanism was not merely a "vehicle for the rise of 
capitalism, the rule of notables, or the establishment of a strong central state" 
(Hunt 198913, p. 2). By exploring such topics as the icons used in local parades, 
the changed content of the revolutionary calendar, and the way language 
facilitated the making of new forms of revolutionary address, Hunt's work 
expanded the notion of political culture. All of these, according to Hunt, must be 
seen as political, and politicizing, forms of life--equally important in making sense 
of the revolutionary process as are classes and the state (Hunt 1984, 198913). 
Hunt explicitly acknowledges, and her work is especially exemplary for it, 
the many influences on her work in addition to that of semiology. These include 
Geertz, Durkheim, Tilly, and Marx. Keith Baker (1982, 1990) and Roger Chartier. 
(1987, 1988, 1991), a third generation Annaliste historian, also go beyond 
semiology. Baker and Chartier both deploy Foucault's (1972a,b, 1977) use of 
autonomous epistemological systems, and Bourdieu's (1977) linkage between 
cultural representations and structures of power and stratification, and 
Habermas7(1989) theory of the public sphere 13. The effect of this kind of 
intellectual recombination is the emergence of a powerful interpretation of the 
cultural origins of the French revolution. Chartier and Baker have turned on its 
head, for example, the traditional evaluation of the impact of Enlightenment 
philosophies' on the revolutionary rupture. By challenging the dichotomization 
between principles and doctrines on the one side and political and social "realities" 
on the other, they have shown how both literary forms and reading practices 
combined with practices of sociability and association joined to create a new 
political culture. Rather than a set of new ideas merely imposed on a public, it is 
these new cultural forms and practices--and the relations of power and class that 
they also embodied--which endowed Enlightenment thought with the different 
sorts of meanings and impact that it actually had. Baker demonstrates the 
structuring power not of particular ideas but the "field of political discourse, a set 
of linguistic patterns and relationships that defined possible actions and utterances 
and gave them meaning" (Baker 1982, p. 212). Bringing together the social and 
representational worlds through the political culture concept, Chartier shows how 
these "discursive associations" played a direct part in challenging the authority of 
the Old Regime--whether through the democratizing impulses of literary sociability 
or through the emergence of what Habermas has called the new eighteenth- 
century public sphere" (Chartier 1991). 
An Assessment: Structure, Culture, and Action 
The renaissance in the political culture concept is less an overcoming of 
what was problematic in the functionalist approach than it is a creation of a new 
way of thinking about the acute difficulty of bringing together structural and 
culturaYmeaningful considerations in studies of political phenomena. It has in fact 
13 . On the value of Habermas's "public sphere" for social analysis see Eley (1989, 1990). 
been the eclectic appropriation and revisions of both French semiotics and post- 
structuralism on the one side, and the post-Parsonian and late Durkheimian work 
of Geertz (1973, 1983) and Bellah (1970, 1980) that has so enriched the new 
generation of studies of political culture (Alexander 198813, 1989, 1990; Collins 
1981, 1988; Hunt 1984; Wuthnow 1987, 1990). Both the Parsonian and the now 
popular rational choice approaches to action are problematic since they empirically 
incorporate culture only to the extent it can be translated into the subjective 
values residing in people's hearts or "preferences." Any initial impulse toward 
understanding the nature and content of a political culture is abandoned by this 
shift into either a systemically- or an ontologically-constituted subjective meaning. 
By contrast the new political culture concept allows political representations and 
practices t o  exist as independent factors in analysis. There is, furthermore, 
enormous explanatory value in reclaiming cultural systems as autonomous 
entities. For autonomy in social analysis detaches political culture from 
"belonging" to either classes or the state; autonomy allows for variable and 
contested appropriations by different groups. While it is rather obvious that 
political culture cannot of itself act, it can affect. By existing as something apart 
from either the economy or the state, a political culture will, when acted upon, 
fundamentally shape the outcome, the meaning, and the very course of political 
action and social processes. An exploration of the impact of legal doctrine and 
practices is an example revealing of the sociological power of a political culture 
approach. Instead of approaching the law as a form of social control or social 
norms, the new political culture model draws attention to the ways that legal 
cultures intersect with power relations and, thus, contribute mightily to identity- 
formation (Somers 1986, 1992). 
Revisions in the previous political culture concept, therefore represent two 
dimensions of fundamental change to the analytic category itself: 1) definitional, 
and 2) causal. In the first case, the post-Parsonians have completely changed the 
definition of what exactly constitutes a political culture. Instead of a collection of 
externalized expressions of subjective values, a political culture is now defined as 
an external system of representations and practices the meaning of which can only 
be determined in its empirical interaction with other domains of social life. In the 
second case, the post-Parsonians have challenged the a priori causal relationship 
of a Parsonian model that defined political culture as a set of values emanating 
from the minds of individuals which were de facto products of the social system 
and its stages of socio-economic development. By contrast, the new political 
cultures are not "caused" by the social structure but develop and change on the 
basis of their own internal rules and processes--as well in historical interaction 
with other domains of social life. 
As the cases above indicate, the results of these dual two changes have been 
far-reaching for the nature of social and political analysis. When it comes to 
explaining political outcomes the consequences of these revisions are: 1) a relative 
abandoning of social structures whether conceived as classes, the state, or stages of 
development (those allegedly primary domains of social life to which culture was so 
long subordinated) in favor of explanatory attention focused on previously 
neglected phenomena such as the conceptual languages of politics, more complex 
forms of power and empowerment embodied in public and civil associations, the 
construction of identities through cultural practices rather than "interests," and 
the rites and rituals of public social life; and 2) an abandoning of the a priori 
causal assumption that (even if they may influence or "mediate" the outcome of 
social processes) these cultural phenomena are themselves explained by deeper 
structures and thus primary social determination cannot be attributed to them, in 
h . .  " favor of the robust assertion that i n  equal, indeed co-determining power, must be 
attributed to both cultures and social structures. 
It is thus clear that the rejuvenated version of political culture bears little or 
> no resemblance to its predecessor. Not only does the change challenge the 
traditional answers to the question--what is the "cause" of cultural phenomena as 
. + 
an object of reality--it also points to entirely new ways of analyzing political and 
social life as a whole. As such, the shift is likely to make it difficult to return to a 
reductionist conception of culture as an epiphenomenon. A t  the same time, 
however, following Jeffrey Alexander's comments about cultural sociology in 
general, this is also somewhat ironic. It is, after all, Durkheim who is one of the 
most significant influences on both the new and the Parsonian usages. In the case 
of the former political culture concept, it was the early Durkheim (Suicide, Rules 
of the Sociological Method, The Division of Labour) while for the latter, it is the 
Durkheim of the Elementary Forms of Religious Life. (Alexander 1989). 14 The 
14 . Alexander (1989,  p.159) also reminds us that Parsons! neglect of the later Durkheim's 
(1965  1912 insistence on the social importance of autonomous cultural systems was not an 
oversight but an explicit rejection. In light of this common heritage, it should also not be 
surprising to recognize a slight Parsonian influence on the revived usage. Although a formidable 
critic as well, Clifford Geertz--one of the three or four most significant influences on the 
development of the new culture concept--was a student of Parsons who forged his ideas in a 
simultaneous appropriation and revision of Parsons (1963,  1973). He did this by bringing 
autonomous meaning to cultural systems and "webs of signification" as such without altogether 
wide extension of the Durkheimian understanding of ritual as an autonomous 
sociological category has been especially influential among American sociologists, 
and a renewed appreciation of political ritual is probably that which sociologists 
most commonly associate with the new political culture concept. 15 The strength 
of these analyses is in their taking seriously Durkheim's belief that religious ritual 
and sacred/profane classifications were general epistemological categories equally 
applicable to modern social analysis of politics and culture as to primitive religions. 
A recent collection of sociological studies explaining such a range of concerns from 
gender relations to mass strikes to Watergate bears this out (Alexander 1988). 
At the same time, however, there is a danger in too singular an association 
of the new political culture concept with ritual alone, indeed in too strong an 
inclination for cultural sociology to claim an absolute autonomy from social 
structure, "material life", or economics. The danger is that this sets up a false 
dichotomy and risks obscuring what is potentially the greatest promise in  the new 
work--namely, its contribution to the urgent task of abandoning the false 
distinctions and binary oppositions between culture and society, the ideal and the 
material, discourse and structure. The real potential of the new concept is that it 
could push us to free the categories of social analysis from these fruitless 
stalemates which have so long divided the social sciences. But the fulfillment of 
this promise lies in recognizing political culture as a category of epistemology. 
Political Culture as Epistemology: 
The Further Promise of a Cultural Socioloq 
The greatest promise of the new political culture concept is in its capacity to 
actually challenge those standards of knowledge in social science that explain why 
cultural or so-called "ideal" constructs have consistently found themselves in a 
position of being dominated by or reduced to those of society. Indeed unless we 
push forward on this epistemological promise we will risk reproducing the same 
perduring hierarchy which enabled Parsons, perhaps inadvertently, to devalue 
cultural analysis in the first place. For the hierarchicalization of the social over 
the cultural is neither a function of definition nor of causal theory; rather, it is a 
product of epistemology. 
abandoning Parsons' initial analytic framework. Skocpol (1985) emphasizes but I believe 
overstates the degree to which Geertz maintained his Parsonianian in her exchange with William 
Sewell (1985) over the place of culture and ideology in the French revolution. 
15 . Thanks to the long-time efforts of Bellah and Tiryakian as well as the more recent ones 
of, among others, Alexander, Hunt, Swidler, and Wuthnow the importance of Durkheim's religious 
sociology for cultural analysis in general, and political cultural analysis in particular, is being 
acknowledged. 
Epistemology, of course, rather than a theory of any single object or process 
is defined by the discipline of philosophy as the theory of knowledge itself. Given 
that epistemology is defined as a set of universal criteria that transcends the 
particularities of any given theory or phenomenon, it represents the foundations of 
knowledge. Richard Rorty (1979) in his historical treatise on the development of 
epistemology in Western thought puts it more ironically: "The desire for a theory 
of knowledge is a desire for constraint--a desire to find 'foundations' to which one 
might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose 
themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid" (p. 3 15). Social science 
epistemology is the theory of how accurate knowledge in the social sciences is 
constituted. Because the discipline of philosophy has both defined and appointed 
to itself the role of ultimate. adjudicator on questions of knowledge-standards (and 
thus on the viability of all other disciplines), the epistemological of the social 
sciences is a critically important topic and all too neglected by sociologists. 
But where exactly does the social science epistemologist search for these 
criteria of certainty? Surely she cannot go out and re-examine the same social 
phenomena as a sociologist in order to proclaim, as it were, a "second opinion." 
This would, after all, simply make philosophers into second rate theorists of social 
life. The object of study and evaluation for the epistemologist making judgments 
about the standards of social knowledge studies representations of reality. Again 
Rorty: "To know is to represent accur'ately what is outside the mind; so to 
understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way i n  
which the mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy's eternal 
concern is to be a general theory of representations, a theory which will divide 
culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it 
less well, and those which do not represent it a t  all (despite their pretense of doing 
so)" (p. 3, my italics). 
Accurate knowledge is thus defined not as "reality" but as the best possible 
representation of reality. Ultimately the epistemologists' hope has always been 
that thorough evaluations of the accuracy of representations will yield a set of 
universal criteria that can be called upon to reliably constitute social knowledge. 
These representational criteria for social knowledge, because they are universal 
and not culture-bound, are considered to be "naturalw--that is, scientific. Thus 
science emerges center stage in the territory of epistemology: the highest 
standards for representational social knowledge are defined as part of science. 
Scientific criteria, accordingly, are not valued because they are uniquely "real". 
Rather, it is because science is the most respected form of  representation; one that 
gains its respect precisely by being universal, foundational, and beyond the 
influence of time, place, and culture.16 But now we have a new question: if 
science is itself a collection of representations of reality, and truth in science is the 
universal accuracy of these representations of the real, then what are the criteria 
epistemologists and scientists use to judge the truth and accuracy of these 
representations? In other words, if science is the touchstone for social knowledge, 
what are the foundations of science itself? To know that the criteria are those of 
universality and transhistoricity is still not enough of an answer. The answer does 
not lie in assertions of truth and accuracy (universality) but in identifying the 
actual object of scientific representation which provides us with the criteria for 
universality and truth, and that object is nature. Only nature exists outside of 
time and space. Only nature escapes the fickleness and fortuitousness of culture 
and history. Only natural representations are believed to be discovered--all other 
representations are constructed. For all the disciplines to which epistemology 
applies, that which is natural, or which functions according to the laws of nature, 
serves to supply the criteria for valid scientific' representations. 
Through a seemingly long argument I have arrived a t  a very simple truth: 
Nature and the presumed certainty of its regularities are a t  the epistemological 
pinnacle of accurate knowledge of the social world. And, quite naturally, all that 
is not nature--all that which is constructed--is in an epistemologically inferior 
position. In this hierarchy is to be found the justification for attributing to culture 
an inferior capacity to produce knowledge of the social world. This is expressed in 
research through the hierarchy of problematicization--that is, what is to be the 
problem-to-be-explained or the question-being-asked? Mainstream philosophy 
(Popper 1954) has discounted the import of question-formation or that which the 
philosophers call the "context of discovery" in favor of the "context of 
justification"; the first is considered mere historical curiosity while the latter is the 
stuff of science (Reichenbach 1947). Yet question of which categories are 
problematized for research is perhaps the most significant epistemological feature 
of social analysis Tha t  which is not problematized is, by definition, "given", or 
natural, and thus i n  a n  epistemologically privileged position to that which is not 
given, but contingent and historical. I n  the social sciences, o f  course, only the 
16 . This, for example, allows both scientists and philosophers to judge the truth of Greek 
astronomy. Even though in his time and with his technology Aristotle may have seemed right, our 
universal representational criteria--science--give us the privilege and the power to make 
transhistorical judgments about truth. 
social structure has achieved the status of a natural object which because it is a 
social fact is not problematic.. 
Herein lies the promise--and, if neglected, the risk--of an epistemological 
approach to political culture. First the risk. In the eagerness to abandon the 
long-reigning determinism of social structure and to assert the autonomy of 
culture, much of the new cultural sociology has made a consequential decision to 
locate "society" (for example, classes and property) on the one side of analysis, and 
culture on the other. But this separation is a mistake for it "frees" social 
structures, both political and economic, from the constitutive power of cultural life 
altogether. Some cultural scholars have effectively said "good riddance." Others 
indicate that this is simply a truce to allow the two approaches to be "separate but 
equal." But nothing could be more self-deluding. In the relationship between 
culture and society, separate is not equal. Why not? To define culture as a 
separate sphere without simultaneously launching a full-scale epistemological 
attack on the hierarchical distinction'between structural (read material) and 
cultural life is tantamount to reinforcing the privileged place of the social system 
as a natural object. That is to say, the complete separation of the cultural from 
the social leaves the latter as the given, and subjects only the cultural to 
problematization. Unless we begin to call into question that which is and is not 
considered a "natural object" we will ultimately endorse the "nkuralizingU of 
society over culture. This has long been the source of cultural reductionism. 
The challenge and the promise facing cultural sociology is, thus, to deploy 
the political culture concept as an epistemological category. This can best be 
carried out through the development of what I have elsewhere called an "historical 
epistemologyy" (Somers 1990,forthcoming a). The task of an historical 
epistemology is considerably different from merely asserting the autonomy of 
culture. The promise of a cultural epistemology using the political culture concept 
is that it launches a "foundational" challenge to the privileging of the very 
categories and modes of knowledge that are used to make sense of the social world. 
At the most immediate level this entails a rejection of the idea that there exists a 
logic of social structure and material life that is not itself politically and culturally 
constituted. 17  But the deeper challenge, indeed that which is necessary before 
17 . In addition to the work of the great cultural and economic sociologists and anthropologists 
Karl Poianyi (19571, Bourdieu (18841, and Sahlins (19751, there are ample models for how this 
analysis can be undertaken in the work of a small but growing body of "social economists" or 
economic sociologists who explore the political and social construction of markets and economies 
(Block 1989; Block and Somers 1984; DiMaggio 1990; DiMaggio and Zukin 1990; Etzioni 1988; 
this first claim will be convincing, is to begin to problematize areas of social life 
heretofore considered "natural objects" and thus in privileged positions over and 
above historical, agential and cultural practices. To use political culture as an 
epistemological category is, moreover, to examine the cultural construction of the 
categories of knowledge and of science which we use to understand culture and 
society. 
Here we would do well to pursue the intellectual resources made available 
by the rootedness of so much of the new cultural sociology in the later works of 
Durkheim as well as his students, MaussO and Halbwachso. For it was 
Durkheiml8 who foreshadowed Foucault's understanding that there are no 
"natural objects," no universal categories which only need to be "particularized" in 
any given historical context: "The first logical categories were social categories; the . 
first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were 
integrated," (Durkheim and Mauss 1963 [1903], vol. 2, p. 82). These 
representational categories are what makes the world accessible to  us. Durkheim 
is not suggesting that there is no reality outside of these representations. His 
argument is that there is no knowledge of that world outside of those categories by 
which we represent that reality. Thus the world as we know it is a product of 
those representations. This in itself does not challenge the epistemological 
hierarchy by which culture is reduced to a function of material life. For if it is 
true, as the philosophers claim, that those representations we call scientific are 
reflections of nature; and if it is also true that for epistemology only scientific 
representations are truly "true", then it still follows that since only 
representations of the structural world have achieved the status of natural 
representations, only they will have the status of being Truths. 
There is only one means, then, to challenge this hierarchy. If we can show 
that the very definition of what is and is not foundational is itself a product of 
culture--a "social category" rather than a "social fact" to use Durkheim's words 
against himself--then we will have overturned the epistemological hierarchy which 
supports the dominating place of society over culture. Why? Because from this 
viewpoint all representations are redefined as social categories rather than natural 
objects and thus precludes the a priori hierarchy of social science domains. As 
social constructions equally vulnerable to the variations of culture, the question of 
Zelizer 1983, 1987. In addition, see Hirschman 1986, 1984; Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 
1987; Bell and Kristol 1981; McCloskey 1985; Sewell 1980, pp. 10- 15). The main body of 
cultural sociologists would do well to take notice. 
18 . Thanks to Val Daniel for pointing out that it was actually Pierce before Durkheim. 
whether cultural and structural life are to be equally.determinative or non- 
determinative or partially determinative in any given situation will be just that--a 
question to be investigated, not an overarching assumption. Be they economies, 
states, markets, symbolic codes, or identities, no aspect of the social world is more 
"natural1' than any other but are, as Chartier puts it "objectifications 
[representations] that construct an original figure each time" (Chartier 1982, p. 
43). 
The work of an historical epistemology is therefore not to claim that all of 
reality is an  "invention" of discourse. For once in categorical form all aspects of 
the social world are equally real dimensions of social reality: "Even the highest 
collective representations have existence and are truly what they are only to the 
extent that they command acts" (Mauss 1927, quoted in Chartier 1988, p. 6). 
Rather, the work of historical epistemology is to illuminate the historicity of those 
standards we use to distinguish between what is and is not natural in the first 
place. Those standards, in other words, are themselves the cultural products of 
social and public activities., The term "historical epistemology" is therefore 
purposefully oxymoronic. It is intended to challenge the assumption that 
epistemological standards of knowledge are premised on the certainties of nature. 
It instead points to a way of practicing social research based on the principle that 
all of our knowledge, our logics, our theories, indeed our very reasoning practices, 
are indelibly (although obscurely), marked with the signature of culture and time. 
They are "history-laden.l'l9 The challenge of a cultural and historical 
epistemology is neither to discover nor invent but to "genealogize" these cultural 
histories through an appropriation of their construction, resonance, and 
contestedness over time. 20 
An historical epistemology thus allows us to question that which is taken to 
be a priori or axiomatic in social research: the regularities of nature endow 
epistemology with the standards to judge the conceptual status of different kinds 
of knowledge of the cultural and the social. An historical epistemology, by 
contrast, presumes that epistemologies are themselves cultural and social. Linking 
history to epistemology allows us to question the "primordial" distinctions at  the 
heart of all social theory between nature and culture. In a different context Paul 
Veyne (another progenitor of the Durkheimian legacy) articulates it this way: "to 
19 . This phrase is meant to evoke, but also to escape, the constricting Manichean dichotomy 
between "theory-laden" versus "empiricist/positivist" conceptions of science and social science 
that frames the terms of controversy among social theorists and philosophers. 
20 . Models for this can be seen in work of Hacking 0, Taylor, and Maclntyre 
relate the so-called natural objects to the dated and rare practices that objectivate 
them and to  explain these practices, not on the basis of a single moving force [of 
nature], but on the basis of all the neighboring practices on which they are 
anchored" (Veyne 1984 [I97 11). 
That constellation of "neighboring practices" forms what I call a "knowledge 
culture" (Somers 1989,1990, forthcoming a). This concept emphasizes the 
historicity of thinking and reasoning practices. I t  differs from the approach of a 
sociology of knowledge in that a knowledge culture does not comprise the 
surrounding "context" in which theories are born and shaped. Nor does it 
comprise any particular set of beliefs, ideologies, or truths. More important than 
any single type of truth, a knowledge culture spans the spectrum of what can even 
be conceived of as possible candidates for being problematized as "true-or-false. "2 1 
A knowledge culture is thus a conceptual and institutional configuration of 
historically-feasible thinking and reasoning practices which themselves comprise 
the full possible spectrum of conceptual and practical possibilities of a given 
historical time and space. The historicity of a knowledge culture is constitutive 
even to those categories and ways of reasoning that we assume to be 
presuppositional--indeed natural. The fundamental characteristic of a knowledge 
culture's conceptual spectrum is that it ultimately delimits what is even 
conceivable in the realms of knowing and explaining. 
What does this have to do with the political culture concept? If honing the 
foundations of epistemology is a public activity, this activity must be part of a 
political culture. To say that epistemological foundations are firm by virtue of 
their given knowledge culture is to define thought, judgment and reason not as a 
private activity of mind (Descartes) but as a public and social activity. Thus to 
make sense of, let alone challenge, our inherited standards of knowledge about 
culture and society requires exploring the political culture in which they thrive. 
When epistemology is itself revealed to be a product of history we can begin to find 
the weak parts of its foundation, and criticize them accordingly. 
We have now come full circle. I have argued that the conceptual dominance 
of social over cultural life is a product of the prevailing social naturalism of our 
intellectual world which ranks things that are natural over those considered 
"socially constructed." I have also proposed that any abandonment of the social in 
21 . This notion of the difference between the absolute notion of truth and the historical 
question of what can be conceived within a given epistemological frame as even a question of 
"true-or-false" originates in Heidegger (1977). 
favor of the cultural is an inadequate and risky way of dislodging the 
epistemologically inferior place that culture has long had, in social theory. Rather 
than "separate but equal," this strategy merely reinforces the hierarchical position 
of the social. Now non distracted by any cultural "nagging" the social is freer 
than ever to dominate "in the last instance" the conceptual landscape.22 The 
work at hand, by contrast, is to deploy the political culture concept to 
genealogically explore the course and consequences of social naturalism. 
Naturalism Unhinped: the Political Culture of Social Science Knowled~e 
The challenge facing the political culture concept is not new. It dates to the 
late eighteenth-century when social naturalism first began to emerge as 
epistemologically supreme. Before that time social thinkers (including Adam 
Smith) believed society and its productive sphere to be regulated by distinctly 
human characteristics--specifically laws and cultural codes. In a line of thoGght 
that can be traced to Aristotle, Smith premised his social and economic theory on 
the distinction between humans and beasts--only the practices of humans could 
serve as the template for analyzing society and social regularities. He explicitly 
excluded biological, physical and geographical factors from the realm of legitimate 
social explanation.23 All of this changed when Malthus and Ricardo discovered 
the grim reality of social naturalism. As in all social discoveries they discovered 
the "natural object" of society-as-naturally regulated through the lens of an 
extraordinary new conceptual grid that would henceforth revolutionize social 
thought. That grid was an apocryphal allegory about a "society" of goats and dogs 
on a desert island living in perfect harmony with each other. Counter to 
prevailing political wisdom, however, the harmonious balance resulted from the 
absence of any state, legal system, or culturally imposed rules. Dubbed the 
"theorem of the goats and dogs," the allegory was widely popularized by the 
eighteenth-century statesman/policy-thinker William Townsend in his ponderous 
public exhortations to repeal Poor Relief for English paupers (1977 [1786]). 
Townsend's "society" was of course a naturalistic fantasia; "natural laws" were 
free to harmoniously organize the island solely because there were no unnatural 
shackles of laws and cultural constraints. 
. 22 . Famous phrase from Althusserian reading of Marxism; actually a letter from Engels 
regarding the relationship between the mode of production and everything else. 
23 . This requires a greater stress in the case of Smith: the mistakes of the Physiocrats had 
alerted him to the dangers of confusing physical nature with man's nature; political economy had 
to be a human science dealing with that which was "natural to man, not to Nature" (Polanyi 
1957, p. 1 12). And see especially Hont and lgnatieff ( 1  983). 
I 
Desperate to understand what they saw was ravaging overpopulation, 
hunger, and skyrocketing Poor Law taxes, Malthus and Ricardo seized upon the 
theorem as the answer for nineteenth-century English society. However grim the 
implications in retrospect, it came as a form of epistemological liberation to learn 
that the laws of society were as inexorable as the laws of beasts and nature: "The 
principle of gravitation is not more certain than the tendency of such laws to 
change wealth and vigor into misery and weakness.. ." The political and 
theoretical implications were clear: Ignore these laws and ineluctably "all classes 
should be infected with the plague of universal poverty" (Ricardo 1929, p. 86). 
The birth of the social sciences was heralded in this "naturalistic moment" when 
the parsimony of social naturalism provided conceptual emancipation from worldly 
problems. But it would be wrong to mistake this for an empirical "disembedding" 
of the economy from society 24. Instead this was an epistemological revolution; 
through the blending of nature and society the social world suddenly gained 
epistemological privilege over the political, the cultural, even the legal. All else 
was relatively powerless in contrast to the gravitational force of nature. Thus, 
whether conceived as the artifacts of social interaction or as multiple societal 
meanings, culture--the "non-natural" and the human--lost its epistemological 
power to the natural.25 
One important aspect of this revolutionary change bears especially upon 
/ 
cultural sociology and the political culture concept. In this epistemological 
transposition of naturalism into society only one substantive sphere of the social 
world achieved the privileged status of being conflated with the regularities of 
nature--namely the economy. Thanks to the central intellectual role of Ricardo, 
Malthus, and of course Adam Smith, in defining the new social sciences (and who 
were less than critically adopted by Marx and Durkheim) the parallel domain in 
the social world to the natural one of scientific knowledge became the material 
self-regulating world of markets and the economy. Only the latter's laws are 
24 . Indeed I do not believe it actually did (Somers, 1990) 
25 . The clearest exemplar of this relationship of social naturalism to the cultural is in 
scientific knowledge itself. We know that the traditional epistemological stance towards scientific 
knowledge is that it is knowledge that is discovered, not constructed. Knowledge that is 
discovered is seen to be natural and abstract, that is foundational and above the historicity and 
contingency of cultural change. Scientific change--the accumulation of knowledge--is of course 
facilitated by human action (laboratory experiments, for example). But according to  this naturalistic 
epistemology scientific change reflects only our cumulative knowledge about the natural world-- 
not the natural object itselfwhich operates on its own natural laws. To say that knowledge . 
changes, from this view, is merely to say that discovery is cumulative, not that its changes are 
socially constituted. 
believed to be discovered, not constructed, and thus endowing the economy with 
the privileged conceptual status of a natural object. As in scientific knowledge, the 
categories of economic science were capable of greater and greater degrees of 
abstraction, a far distance from the historicity and contingency of the cultural 
world.26 
The natural "laws of society," now perceived to be the epistemological 
categories through which the social world could be known, were thus in one 
consequential swoop conflated with what were in fact 'merely contemporary ideals 
about the naturalism of market processes. The conceptual boundary collapsed 
between society--previously conceived in terms of actual social relationships (laws, 
politics, association; Bossy 1982; Williams 1976,pp.243-47)--and the newly 
naturalized economy. Normative nineteenth-century political beliefs about 
economics were, with the abstract notion of "the social", flattened into one and the 
same level of foundational knowledge. As a result each became identified with the 
characteristics of the other: "the social" as an abstract epistemological category 
lost its cultural, public, and associational meaning and instead absorbed the 
contemporary theory of the natural economy by in effect becoming little more than 
an elaboration of the theory of a self-regulating market. And the economy in turn 
absorbed and came to reflect the new epistemology of "the social" by receiving the 
privileged epistemological status of a natural object. Its assumed foundationalism 
meant that it was only possible to truly understand economic processes by 
abstracting them from the concreteness of any particular historical context. The 
particularities of context--cultural, political, legal, religious, and so on--were to be 
bracketed in order to achieve a certain epistemological purity of economic analysis. 
Only then could foundational economic laws be discerned. 
This was the political culture which decisively shaped the growth of the 
social sciences. A silent collusion among the disciplines--and here American 
sociology is especially guilty--has long reinforced the epistemological naturalism of 
economics (Ross 1991, Zald 1992).27 Its foundational claims elevated the study of 
26 . This does not mean that economies don't change--any more than i t  means this about 
scientific knowledge. But as in science economic transformations may be facilitated by social 
action--policy decisions, stock market activities, even revolutions--but these interventions are 
not constitutive to  the laws of the market; they are what economists call "impairments." This 
doesn't mean that they always impair market functioning; they may help it The impairment refers 
to impairing the abstract natural model of the market For this reason, in studying economies-- 
that is, in discovering laws--these impairments are bracketed as exogenous. 
27 . Sociologists did not have to agree with the individualistic rational actor premises Ian 
ontological argument about the nature of the economy) to  collude in this. Although a fraction of 
sociologists (economic sociology) have always challenged the premises o f  the autonomous market- 
markets to the role of "queen of the social sciences." In the new field of sociology, 
theories of economic systems and markets became the given base-line on which 
further research was only to build, not to question. This was not merely a matter 
of disciplinary turf. It was an acceptance of social naturalism: that which was 
natural could only be studied for its causal impact on the rest of society, rather 
than in itself be the subject of problematization. Since I have proposed that the 
question of what can or cannot be problematized for research may perhaps be the 
most significant epistemological feature of social analysis, this was a consequential 
and substantial collusion within the political culture itself. Since culture, politics, 
and law were now understood to be historical creations, their relative standing 
diminished precisely because they were subjected to investigation. Social science 
knowledge became synonymous with exploring the social world from the 
foundational grounds of the economy. The "social" and the "economic" conflated 
into the only certainties of social knowledge. 
Political Culture and the Denaturine of Property 
So far I have demonstrated that the political culture concept can greatly 
enlarge our consciousness of the contingent and historical character of all 
epistemology. But there is more. For if epistemology is a product of history, there 
must have been rival epistemologies of how to understand the social world. Why 
one epistemology wins out over another is, therefore, an historical and political 
question rather than a scientific one. 
One such rival view involves property, citizenship and rights-formation. It 
is not surprising that the concept of property, widely believed to be the driving 
force of socio-economic development and conflict, is also a t  the heart of social 
naturalism. Townsend's allegory once again will help illustrate its foundational 
place. In it he makes explicit the correlation between property, naturalism, and 
social equilibrium. Because his "society" had been freed from the shackles of 
government and law, the "natural" population would consist of only two "racesM-- 
property owners and labourers. Since the propertyless would be driven tq labour 
not by laws but by natural hunger, production would be self-regulating. By 
contrast, historically-constructed laws would be needed only to protect the 
propertied from the potential theft of the propertyless(Townsend 1979 117861). 
The relationship of property to society became not only foundational and natural; 
-what Polanyi called the "economistic fallacy"--unlike in the area of knowledge and science, 
sociologists have not challenged the epistemological premises which define how and which areas 
are eligible for problematization in the first place. 
but, metaphorically, biological. Although its crudity has been long surpassed, the 
fable still highlights the conceptual link between property and political rights. In 
other words, with the. inexorable force of nature, property is foundational--a 
natural, even biological, force; political forms are cultural constructions which 
either interfere with the regularities of nature (as in the case of state regulations 
such as the Poor Laws) or which are the necessary effect of that same natural 
force (as in the need for laws to protect property). 
Theories of citizenship--one of the most significant dimensions of a political 
culture--are among the casualties of this original conceptual transformation of the 
link between nature and culture; Otherwise dissimilar theories converge on a 
single presupposition concerning citizenship: citizenship, the historically contingent 
cultural subject of study is the effect; changing property relations, the foundational 
natural object, are the cause. In natural rights theories, for example, (of both the 
right and the left) civil liberties emerge as a right attached to the property created 
by autonomous labour--what has since been called the "workmanship ideal" (Tully 
1980). In more sociological theories such as T. H. Marshall's (1950), he explains 
the expansion of citizenship by the processes of class formation and the changing 
nature of property relations a t  the heart- of this dynamic. 
As an example of the power of the political culture concept I will take a 
different kind of look a t  the meaning of property and its relationship to citizenship. 
< 
Using T.H. Marshall as a point of reference is especially pertinent. Not only is it 
a classic of sociology, it also represents prevailing social science theories of the 
developmental relationship between property and modern political culture.28 In 
Marshall's theory citizenship is a product of the emergence of property relations. 
Any early expressions of rights were impeded by status inequalities of feudalism 
and its lack of private property. Only the emergence of individualism and 
property necessary to and promoted by capitalism enabled the initial "take-off' of 
what he labeled civil citizenship rights. Furthermore the needs of newly privatized 
property owners (landed gentry) for free labour and bourgeois demands for mobile 
property set the motor in gear for the movement toward civil rights. Subsequent 
contradictions between property relations and the exclusions and inequalities of 
the class system kept the engine going. Political citizenship was a product of the 
nineteenth-century ascendancy of industrial property owners--the middle class, 
while social citizenship came in the twentieth century'with the power of the 
28 . See aslo Bendix (19641; Tilly (1990a, 1990b); Giddens 11985); Barbalet (1988); Turner 
(1986). For an important exception see Walzer (1970, 19821. 
working class. Marshall thus analyzes citizenship-formation as ultimately 
stemming from the revolutionary transformations consequent to individual 
property relations--each right a product of the developmental logic of private 
property and its social consequences. 
In my counter-scenario of rights-formation, property is also deeply 
significant. But in my argument property is not a natural object or an 
independent variable whose effect can be particularized over time. In the context 
of political culture I will describe below, property is a cultural product. Property 
signified not a "thing" to be owned, but a set of membership relations to which one 
gained the right to be attached (Somers 1986, forthcoming b). To understand the 
extent of this radical inversion in assumptions I will briefly summarize the broad 
contours of my research. 
The institutional roots of Marshall's three-fold conception of citizenship were 
neither in the transition to capitalism, nor in the birth of class society, but in the 
legal revolutions of medieval England, the formation of medieval urban political 
cultures, and the national public sphere. Only the English public sphere, alone 
among Western countries, appropriated from below and extended throughout the 
land the political culture and legal conventions of the medieval cities and (to a 
lesser extent) the public villages which had their own non-feudal legal cultures and 
social practices. As a result, the public sphere came to reflect the political culture 
of the city "writ-large" in which remedies of procedural justice (civil citizenship) 
ensuring personal liberty coexisted with both national regulatory and 
redistributive statutes (social citizenship) as well as legal doctrines which 
commanded community participation (political citizenship) in the administration of 
law. To fully situate these claims, let me turn to an exploration of urban political 
culture. 
In popular lore, medieval cities are most renowned for having been a refuge 
for personal liberty in an age of arbitrary feudal power and insecurity (Harding 
1980,pp.442-47; Smith 1963; Bloch 1961, vol. 1; Black 1984, pp. 39, 42). "A year 
and a day" was the customary amount of "city-air" an escaped serf needed to gain 
freedom from a manorial lord. But equally important was not this negative liberty 
of the freed serf but the positive liberty of citizenship rights to which a surprising 
number of the population laid claim. Not just elites and bourgeois merchants, but 
numerous artisans as well "possessed" the freedom of the city and hence the rights 
of citizenship--the right to law (civil), the right to participate (political), and the 
right to livelihood (social). This freedom, moreover, was a form of property; it was 
possessed by those who held rights to its claim. Clearly this was not the kind of 
freedom and property described by Marshall. The hallmark of these urban 
"freedoms" were their rooting in the property of membership.29 How did this 
property develop and why did so many urban working people have relatively 
extensive rights long before the "proper" naturaYstructura1 cause? 
The answer lies in the place of the guild in the urban political culture.30 In 
a process of struggle lasting almost half a century, guilds battled local elites of 
merchants and authorities and eventually won both official recognition and notable 
power in local governance. The triumph occurred in 1319 by b y a l  Charter under 
King Edward 11: all "inhabitants to be admitted [into the freedom] shall be of 
some mistery.. . "; anyone seeking to obtain the freedom who did not belong to a 
guild "shall then only be admitted with full assent of the commonality assembled" 
(cited in Rappaport 1989, p.31). In translation that meant that to become a 
citizen one had to enter into or "possess" the "freedom" of the town or city. Yet 
entry to the freedom and thus to citizenship could only be achieved through 
membership in a guild (the mistery). Thus was forged a mighty bond between 
guild membership and citizenship. It was not the division of labour or the mode of 
production that shaped artisanal rights and created this political culture. Rather 
it was the political culture of the guild which gave artisans' access to the public 
sphere of citizenship. In order to make sense of this it is necessary to reconstruct 
the practices and institutions of that political culture, its civil rules and codes of 
membership.3 1 For therein lay its power. 
In a city or a town more was required for a skilled artisan to ply the trade 
than knowledge and a technical skill. To practice the "arte and mystery" of a 
craft required guild membership. Only members of a guild could legally practice 
their craft in a town, but guild membership in turn required the possession of a 
crucial kind of property--the property of an apprenticeship.32 Apprenticeship, of 
course, is generally thought of as period of training for a skill, but the meaning of 
an apprenticeship was not primarily in its technical training. Seven years was the 
standard time required to serve as an apprentice but a t  the end of the service the 
artisan did not "leave" behind the apprenticeship for it only in part represented 
29 . London is of course the most outstanding case. 
30 . On guilds see Thrupp (1963); Brentano (1963); Abrams and Wrigley (1977); Wrigley (1987); 
Reynolds (1  977); Corfield ; Black ( 1  984); Rappaport ( 1  989 ,  1988); Nussdorfer (1 988); Bossenga 
(1  988); Nightengale ( 1  989). 
31 . The merchant Guild preceded the crafts guild, but the latter (composed of masters and 
journeymen) became far more important 
32 . On apprenticeship, see especially Lipson (1920 ,  vol. I, chap. VIII). 
the journeyman's training and investment of time. More significantly the 
credential of an apprenticeship signified the new "ownership" of a set of social and 
political relations and connections, a guaranteed place in a deep culture of 
attachments, as well as all the rights and obligations consequent to those 
attachments. The apprenticeship now became the artisan's "propertyv--a 
permanent credential belonging to the artisan endowing benefits as long as these 
were exercised within the guild. This was not mobile property that attached to 
the individual crafts person. 33 The property acquired during an apprenticeship 
was in fact the property of social membership. 
The key to this relational conception of property is in the medieval word for 
skill, which is "mistery" (as in the 'arte and mistery of weaving'). One reason skill 
was a mistery was because knowledge of a craft was viewed as a specialized and 
symbolic secret that should take time and trust to acquire (O.E.D.. 1933, vol. x, 
pp. 815-16).34 But mistery had another meaning and use that prevailed over the 
first: a mistery was also the medieval word for the craft guild itself, the social 
body, the fellowship, the corporate and instituted group (O.E.D. 1933, vol. x, pp. 
815-16; Brentano 1963, p. cxxxii). Unlike the word skill which is singular and 
individual, mistery was simultaneously individual and corporate. To possess the 
mistery bas to simultaneously "possess" knowledge and membership.35 In modern 
social science and economics skill is defined as "human capitalw--a technical . 
capacity which endows economic power to an individual. But in the political 
culture of the guild an "unskilled" worker was not defined as such because he or 
she was technically incompetent. Indeed, through a wide array of illegal practices 
many "unskilled" workers in fact were technically trained. The definition of an 
"unskilled","dishonorable", and "illegal" worker was to work without the property 
of an apprenticeship, that is, to work without a mistery, without honor, without 
the bounds and the bonds of association and without the political culture of 
membership. The attachments of membership, not training or ability alone, 
conferred legality and the property of ski11.36 
33 . Tramping, one of the most important forms of labour migration, was contained within 
social membership. networks, see Leeson (1  983). 
34 . In ancieni Greece, the craftsmen were, like priests and doctors, believed to possess some 
secret power, see Godelier ( 1 9801. 
35 . For various references to "mystery," "mistery," "misterium," "misterium artis," or "mestera, 
misteria, from ministerium," as the collective body of the craft guild (rather than the skill itself) 
see Hibbert ( 1 9 6 3 , ~ .  210); Berman (1983,  p. 3911; Reynolds (1977, p. 1651; Black (1984,  p. 
14); Leeson (1983 ,  p. 261. 
36 . On illegal shops as unapprenticed ones, see Lipson (1931,  vol. ii, p. 41). 
The property of apprenticeship and skill was therefore a form of cultural 
capital. It was a social and cultural "mister~1," not a technical secret or individual 
attribute. At the end of the service, the crafts-person (now a journeyman) was 
taken through a public ceremony in which he or she swore by oath to follow the 
guild's rules and obligations.37 With that oath the artisan was entitled and 
obligated to the connections and the powers embodied in the property of 
. apprenticeship. This included citizenship, livelihood, employment, mutual aid, 
religious life, social organizations--indeed an entire cradle to grave culture, as well 
as the mandate to participate in public ceremonial processions and "mistery plays" 
which affirmed the political identity of membership (Adams-Phythian 1976, pp. 
106-07). 
The property of cultural membership thus turned out to be the key to the 
city. But the relationality of the guild's political culture hardly resembles the ideal 
typicality of a gemeinschaft world. Rather, the purpose of the property of 
membership was precisely to provide the foundations for independence and 
personal liberties. The prominent emphasis among artisans on independence and 
autonomy suggests the importance of distinguishing the normative from the 
institutional conception of rights. The right to the freedom of practicing one's skill, 
as well as that of citizenship, achieved the goal of individual empowerment. But 
this empowerment only had viability when rooted in the institutional foundations 
of attachments and membership. Only the possession of membership allowed for 
individual empowerment and the meaningful exercise of rights. Creating a public 
sphere as in part the city writ-large did not automatically confer these citizenship 
rights on all people, or to the same effect. But among "the people" those included 
and excluded (including gender exclusion) were based less on class divisions or land 
ownership than on the political contingencies and power of membership. 
One of the results of this approach is a revised conception of property. The 
classical paradigm considers property to be a matter of ownership derived from 
autonomous labour; as such it is conceived in terms of a relationship between 
individual persons and things--whether the thing is land or the fruits of labour. 
Conversely, the absence of material property is correlated with proletarianization 
and powerlessness. But a deeper exploration into its political culture reveals that 
37 . On the number of women in guilds, see L. Smith (19631, Levi Fox ( 1; Leeson (1983, 
p.27-8). On oaths and obligations, see Prothero, p. 37; Thrupp, pp. 184, 232-33;  Hibbert (vol. 
Ill, pp. 157-229, p. 210); leeson I ,passim). 
38 . For the strongest evidence on this point, see Black (1984, passim), as well as the 
numerous guild documents collected in T. Smith (1963). 
property was not a "thing. " Rather a property (propriety = one's own relations) 
was a network of relationships among persons, and between persons, institutions, 
and the larger public sphere. It was not property that caused citizenship; it was 
the political culture of membership that produced property and the rights of 
property were expressed through the cultural capital of membership rights. 
Property could take the form of land, the house, or most importantly, of skill. But 
regardless of its form, its meaning was relational. The rights of property in effect 
only existed within the context of relationships and the political culture of which 
they were a part. . Beginning in the seventeenth century, this relational 
concept of property was forced to compete with a newly developed idea of liberty 
based solely on the individual rights of property produced from autonomous labour. 
Since then these Lockean ideas of natural rights have dominated the social history 
of politics. But not only did the former public conception of rights and freedom 
prove remarkably robust in its competition with Locke's ideas; arguably, it was 
more significant in shaping modern popular conceptions of and claims to 
citizens hip. 
Conclusion 
I have developed in this paper the argument that Parsons' original move to 
endow significance to culture was a tremendous advance in the social sciences. 
Only in his rejection of culture as a means to sociological knowledge did he 
inadvertently contribute to the subsequent reduction of cultural meaning to social 
systemic determination. The new political culture concept, by contrast, militantly 
has staked its claim on the autonomy of culture from society. But herein lie the 
pit-falls as well as the potential of the new approach. As important as has been 
this revival and revision of the once moribund concept, i t  reproduces some of the 
same problems of the previous one--especially the worrisome binary opposition 
between culture and society. Cultural studies have too often simply turned away 
from the economic and social to explore the cultural as an autonomous separate 
sphere. While this no longer be reduces political culture to a function of the social 
system, it is also a very risky strategy. For in the social science categories in 
which we currently work, as long as the social retains its epistemological 
39 . For several influential discussions of property see Pocock (1985a, 1985b); Tully (1980); 
Dickinson ( 1977). 
40 . This is fully developed in Somers (1986, and forthcoming b). 
association with naturalism, and culture with history, separate will not be 
equal.41 
In an essay criticizing the approach to mentalites characteristic of his own 
Annaliste background, Roger Chartier argues that the ways we classify and 
represent the social world are themselves the "constituents of social 
reality.. . .Instruments of power, the stakes of struggles as fundamental as economic 
struggles, the systems of classification or images of social order are all 
transformers of this very order; by modifying the demands ... attached to some 
position or another; by shifting the frontiers between groups ... even by bringing 
into existence new groups or new classes ...[ they are] a reality as real as the 
concreteness of the relations within a society" (Chartier 1982, p. 41-42).42 
The real challenge facing the new political culture concept is thus in its 
capacity as an epistemological tool to move us beyond the society versus culture 
dichotomy supported by both the old and the new versions of the term. It enables 
us to challenge what is and is not axiomatic in social analysis, the privileging of 
certain spheres over others, and the presuppositional insulation of the social from 
the kind of historical and epistemological problematization characteristic of every 
other sphere of society. That which we consider natural, material, and 
founda t i~na l - -~ ro~er t~ ,  for example--takes on an entirely different meaning when 
the embeddedness of all spheres of social knowledge within time and space is 
emphasized. The greatest contribution, then, of the new political culture concept 
is not that it can give us new and improved explanations, but that it can give us 
new questions. This alone will reorient us as to what it is we ought to be asking 
in the first place.43 
41 . This is often reinforced even among cultural theorists by the use of such terms as 
"extra-economic", "non-economic", or the "relative autonomy from the economy of culture". This 
language simply underlines the degree to which economic processes continue to be treated as the 
natural base-line of social analysis. 
42 . In this formulation Chartier explicitly acknowledges the influence of Bourdieu, see for 
example 11 982 p. 4 1). 
43 . In Somers i1989,forthcoming) I have pursued in greater detail the impact on the social 
sciences of the neglect of the study of question-formation and problematization. 
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